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The rise in American inequality has been exaggerated both in magnitude and timing.  Commentators
lament the large gap between the growth rates of real median household income and of private sector
productivity.  This paper shows that a  conceptually consistent measure of this growth gap over 1979
to 2007 is only one-tenth of the conventional measure.  Further, the timing of the rise of inequality
is often misunderstood.  By some measures inequality stopped growing after 2000 and by others inequality
has not grown since 1993.  This cessation of inequality’s secular rise in 2000 is evident from the growth
of Census mean vs. median income, and in the income share of the top one percent of the income distribution.
The income share of the 91st to 95th percentile has not increased since 1983, and the income ratio of
the 90th to 10th percentile has barely increased since 1986.  Further, despite a transient decline in
labor’s income share in 2000-06, by mid-2009 labor’s share had returned virtually to the same value as
in 1983, 1991, and 2001.
Recent contributions in the inequality literature have raised questions about previous research on skill-biased
technical change and the managerial power of CEOs.  Directly supporting our theme of prior exaggeration
of the rise of inequality is new research showing that price indexes for the poor rise more slowly than
for the rich, causing most empirical measures of inequality to overstate the growth of real income of
the rich vs. the poor.  Further, as much as two-thirds of the post-1980 increase in the college wage
premium disappears when allowance is made for the faster rise in the cost of living in cities where
the college educated congregate and for the lower quality of housing in those cities.  A continuing
tendency for life expectancy to increase faster among the rich than among the poor reflects the joint
impact of education on both economic and health outcomes, some of which are driven by the behavioral


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































income is defined as before individual taxes and excludes capital gains. 1979- 1979- 1995- 1995- 2000-
2007 1995 2007 2000 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1.  Census Median Household Income 0.49 0.31 0.73 1.87 -0.09
2.  Census Mean Household Income 0.93 0.96 0.90 2.50 -0.25
3.  Mean minus Median (line 2 minus line 1) 0.44  0.65 0.17 0.63 -0.16
4.  Census Median Income per Person (15+) 1.15 1.00 1.34 2.68 0.39
5.  Census Mean Income per Person (15+) 1.25 1.21 1.29 2.90 -0.05
6.  Mean minus Median (line 5 minus line 4) 0.09 0.21 -0.05 0.22 -0.44
7.  Deflator Used by Census (CPI-RS) 3.50 4.24 2.51 2.30 2.65
8.  PCE Deflator 3.27 4.16 2.09 1.76 2.32
9.  GDP Deflator 3.15 3.87 2.19 1.64 2.58
10.  Median Income per Person (15+) with GDP deflator 1.50 1.37 1.65 3.34 0.46
11.  Total Economy Output per Hour 1.66 1.28 2.17 2.30 2.08
12.  Nonfarm Private Business Sector Output per Hour 1.95 1.43 2.64 2.71 2.59
13.  Conventional Income-Productivity Gap (line 12 minus line 1) 1.46  1.12 1.91 0.84 2.52
14.  Alternative Income-Productivity Gap (line 11 minus line 10) 0.16  -0.09 0.52 -1.04 1.62
15.  Alternative Gap as percent of Conventional Gap (line 13 / line 12) 11.0  -8.0 26.9 -123.8 76.0
Memo Items:
16.  Mean Income per Person with GDP Deflator 1.60  1.58 1.60 3.56 0.02
17.  Hours per Person 0.20 0.41 -0.08 0.76 -0.69
18.  Output per Person (line 11 plus line 17) 1.86  1.69 2.09 3.06 1.39
19.  Gap of Income Growth minus Output Growth (line 16 minus line 18) -0.26 -0.11 -0.49  0.50 -1.37
 
20.  Employee Compensation minus GDI Growth -0.23 -0.27 -0.18 0.14 -0.41
21.  Share of Income Gap Explained by Change in Labor's Share 88.5 245.5 37.1 28.0 29.9
Table 1
Annual Growth Rates, Median and Mean Income and Productivity, Selected Intervals, 1979-2007Figure 1.  Income Share of Employee Compensation













tFigure 2.  Ten-Year Moving Average of Income Share of Employee 
Compensation and 40 Percent of Proprietor's Income












tFigure 3.  CPS Percentile Income Ratios for Both Men and Women,




















90-50Figure 4.  Wage Income Shares of Top 1 Percent, Percentiles 96-99, 








































































































Capital Income Capital GainsFigure 6.  Average Pay of Top 100 CEOs and of Rank 100 CEO
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Top 100
Rank 100Figure 7.  Top 0.1% Income Shares in the U.S., France, and the U.K.,1913-2006
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